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Abstract This paper proposes a new approach to electronic roadpri-
cing, based on a division of the roadpricing area into cells, each with
their own fee. Some of the cells are secretly marked as check cells. On
board equipment contains a secure element that is made aware of these
check cells and helps the pricing authorities to monitor the user. This ap-
proach is not only original but it also improves upon earlier approaches
since it solves issues regarding positioning accuracy, collusion between
different users, and the required level of interaction.
1 Introduction
Roadpricing, also known as Electronic Traffic Pricing (ETP), refers to a location-
based charge for road use. It exists in several forms, for instance via charges for
entering the city center (London) or for particular motorways (France or Italy),
or for lorries (Germany). Here we consider satellite-based systems, using GPS
or Galileo, for personal vehicles. Such approaches have been elaborated to some
extent in the Netherlands, as part of earlier, now abandoned, government plans.
However, at the European level this form of roadpricing is still on the political
agenda (based on the framework [1,2]). The main reasons for replacing a flat
road tax by a location-based approach are: (1) fairness of charges, since one only
pays for actual road use, and (2) the possibility to steer the traffic supply via a
flexible pricing policy (e.g. making busy roads expensive during rush hours).
Location-based roadpricing for personal vehicles is a highly privacy sensit-
ive matter since it requires detailed location information of individual vehicles.
Public support depends on proper privacy protection via an architecture guar-
anteeing data minimalisation focused on the goal of roadpricing itself, and not
on secondary goals (like speed limit enforcement). The topic has been picked up
in the computer security research community, see [3,7,6], and several different
protocols have been proposed. This paper contributes with a novel protocol, that
uses cells (covering the roadpricing area) both for fee calculation and for fraud
detection (via a secure element, like a smart card, embedded in the car’s toll
device). Our approach addresses some problems with fraud detection in earlier
protocols, like time-dependence, collusion, GPS-precision and required level of
interaction. The paper does not introduce any new cryptographic primitives and
makes use of existing techniques. Its value lies in adapting these techniques in
an original manner to a context of considerable societal relevance.
2 Preliminaries
We adopt the main building blocks of the Electronic Toll Pricing (ETP) archi-
tecture proposed by the European Union [1]. It distinguishes the following five
components/parties of the system:
• an ETP subscriber;
• a toll charger TC;
• a toll service provider TSP;
• an on board unit OBU, in every (personal) vehicle;
• a secure element SE incorporated in the OBU.
An ETP subscriber is the party that uses the road of the toll charger and for this
subscribes to a toll service provider. The main information security objectives of
the subscriber are twofold. The first objective is that he gets to pay the correct
amount for road usage and that he can validate that. The second objective
is that the subscriber’s privacy can sufficiently protected in the scheme. This
obviously includes more than protection of the subscriber’s road movements
but we concentrate on this aspect in this paper. With sufficient protection we
mean that the subscriber accepts the privacy protection design of the toll service
provider system and has assurance that the actual implementation adheres to
the design (‘public trust’).
Preferably, the privacy protection the scheme provides should be paramet-
erizable and the subscriber should be able to validate the privacy protection
himself without having to rely on a (trusted) third party. The toll charger TC
is the party that collects a toll fee for the usage of the roads and defines the
prices and conditions of use. Typically national or regional authorities are TCs,
but also commercial parties ‘owning’ the roads, can be a TC.
The toll service provider TSP is the party that provides the ETP service.
It periodically determines the fee to be paid by each subscriber (vehicle) for
his road usage. In this paper we are often not very explicit about the difference
between the TC and TSP, since the distinction is not so relevant for the protocol.
An important information security objective shared by the TC and TSP is
that subscribers are correctly charged for the road usage and can detect fraud.
A specific security objective of the TC is that he should be able to validate that
usage of its roads is correctly reflected in the payments of the TSP.
The on board unit OBU is a satellite (GPS or Galileo) enabled device that will
be attached to every vehicle subscribed to the ETP service. We assume that this
device stores a pricing function P that takes as input a location l and a time t and
it outputs a price p which corresponds the toll price of the corresponding road
at time t. Furthermore, the OBU must have a timing device which is reasonably
in sync with the local time. It should also be able to occasionally communicate
with the TSP in order to report usage and to update the pricing function (and
a list of checkpoints that corresponds with the location of surveillance cameras,
see below).
Although the OBU should be reliable it is untrusted, from a systems per-
spective: subscribers may try to manipulate it, for instance via the power supply
or via the satellite signals (shielding the device or feeding it false signals), in
order to reduce the fee they need to pay.
The secure element SE is a tamper resistant device, like a smartcard, which
has a modest amount of non-volatile memory and processing power. This pro-
cessing power must be enough to perform basic (public key) cryptographic op-
erations. Typically, the secure element does not have its own power or clock. It
is comparable to a SIM card in a mobile phone albeit with more cryptographic
capabilities.
2.1 Thin and fat OBU’s
Before going into the technicalities, we briefly describe the setting and the main
idea underlying the protocol that is proposed in this paper.
In all satellite-based roadpricing systems vehicles have an on board unit OBU
that can at least determine the location of the vehicle and communicate with
the back-office. In [7] a distinction is made between thin and fat OBU’s. A thin
OBU just collects location information and passes it on the back-office where the
appropriate fee is calculated. This is a simple but extremely privacy-unfriendly
approach, since the sensitive location information is stored outside the direct
control of the individual involved, in a large database that is vulnerable in various
ways. A fat OBU on the other hand is capable of calculating the price itself, via
a pricing function that is executed in a secure environment. At the end of a
reporting period the OBU sends the cumulative fee to the TSP.
The fat approach is privacy friendly but has two big disadvantages:
1. a fat OBU is more complex than a thin one, and thus more expensive and
more vulnerable;
2. fraud detection is more complex with fat OBU’s in comparison with thin
ones.
One way to handle the first point is to reduce the trusted computing base (TCB)
of an OBU to a minimum and to place this TCB on a tamper-resistant secure ele-
ment SE such as a smart card. This separation makes it easier to add additional
(commercial) services to the OBU, or alternatively, to add roadpricing function-
ality to existing in-car equipment (such as satellite navigation) by adding the
secure element3.
The second point is a serious issue. First, fraud detection with thin OBU’s
is easy: a TC/TSP just places roadside camera’s at random places and check
3 The secure element is bound to a particular individual, and can via this separation
be transferred from one vehicle to another.
if the vehicles that pass by report the location where they are spotted. If not,
the car owners will be fined. One sensitive point in this approach is that camera
locations must remain secret, throughout the reporting period. If they become
known, drivers may simply switch off their OBU and take a different route,
avoiding cameras. With a fat OBU one way of fraud detection is to have the
TC/TSP communicate briefly from a roadside detection point with the (secure
element in the) OBU of each passing car in order to check if the last few locations
used by the pricing function are consistent with the check locations. We remark
that the ETP architecture [1] actually suggests the usage of 5.8 GHz Dedicated
Short-Range Communications (DSRC) for this. However, since such checks are
active, involving two-way communication, they will be noticed very quickly by
passing cars. The check locations will thus become publicly known, negatively
affecting the efficacy of the checks.
Another fraud detection approach is to let the OBU (or its secure element)
commit itself to each step of the fee calculation, for instance via a simple hash
function [7] or via a more complex non-interactive commitment scheme [3] (using
homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs to exclude negative sub-
fees). After receiving a (cumulative) fee report, the TC/TSP may ask the OBU
to “open” certain commitments, corresponding to roadside camera locations, in
order to check details of the cumulative report. Auditing thus involves interac-
tion with the user, even in the case where everything turns out to be fine. In
contrast, with the approach proposed here there will only be interaction with
the user in case fraud is detected.
A crucial problem with the commitment approach is its vulnerability to collu-
sion, exploiting time dependence. During such commitment checks the locations
of the road-side camera’s become known. If checks are performed immediately,
like in [3], people may collude, where one of them (who drives a lot) reports
first and learns about the check locations and the other ones subsequently delete
commitments for non-check locations in their fee reports (thus reducing their
fee).
Hence such checks can only be performed well after the reporting period,
when all OBU’s have sent in their fee report. But such timing dependency may
introduce other vulnerabilities. What should happen if you are on holiday at
the end of the reporting period, outside the roadpricing area, and outside reach
of the TSP? If you are allowed to send in your report with a delay, when you
return, you could adapt your fee report based on knowledge of the checkpoints.
Such manipulations can exploit the fact that secure elements do not have their
own (secure) clock and so you can feed them false timing information. One way
of addressing this “absence” problem is forcing OBU’s to report their fee as soon
as they leave the roadpricing area. This naturally leads to the idea of carving
up the area into cells (where border cells play a special role). Another problem
with the commitment approach is that it requires communication with the OBU
after fee reporting allowing fraudsters to claim their OBU is broken or stolen.
We finally note the scheme described in [8]. It has a thin OBU in the sense
that it is based on a vehicle transponder that constantly sends time-location
tuples to the TSP. However these tuples are not associated with vehicles but with
commitments to random tags constructed by the subscribers in a registration
phase and transferred to their vehicle transponder. During the reconciliation
phase the fee is calculated based on secure multiparty computation involving
the TSP and the subscriber through a web application. Enforcement is also
based on spot checks; in a zero knowledge fashion the subscriber needs to prove
he generated a time-location consistent with the spot check. This scheme not
only requires substantial subscriber interaction but also allows the subscriber to
claim his tag information being lost.
2.2 Current protocol idea
We now assume that the roadpricing area (country, region, or continent) is
covered by square, non-overlapping cells of a relatively small size (e.g. a square
kilometer). When you enter a cell you will have to pay a certain amount, de-
pending on the cell (and possibly the time of day). These payment details are
incorporated in a payment function P that will be left unspecified. As long as
you stay within one cell, there is no further charge. But there will be a new
charge as soon as you enter the next cell. In Subsection 2.3 we elaborate a bit
more on the organization of these cells.
A certain subset of cells are marked as “check cells” or “checkpoints” and
contain (hidden) roadside cameras connected with Automated Number Plate
Recognition (ANPR) equipment. These markings are chosen by the TSP and the
TC and change every billing period (of, say, one or three months). The secrecy
of these markings is crucial for the protocol. Another crucial aspect is that the
secure element in the OBU gets to know these checkpoint markings, via a secure
connection with the TSP, but the subscriber or its (untrusted) OBU should not
learn any information about the current checkpoints. This confidential transfer
of checkpoints happens before the beginning of each new billing period.
Upon entering a new cell, the OBU reports— or ‘declares’, as we shall say
below—this transition to its SE. The SE replies with a “ticket”. The ticket is a
(randomized) encryption of fixed data, e.g. ‘OK’ or ‘0’ with some padding if the
new cell is not a checkpoint. But if the cell is a checkpoint—which is known to
the SE but not to the OBU—the ticket will be meaningful for fraud detection
later on. The encryptions should be such that one cannot determine which tickets
are for checkpoint cells and which are for non-checkpoint cells. In this way the
trusted element works against its owner, in the interest of the TC and TSP: it
secretly monitors the user. Thus, the SE is the TC and TSP’s ambassador (or
spy, if you like), see also [4].
Driving around without a proper, up-to-date list of check cells is dangerous,
because without it your SE cannot produce appropriate tickets when you hap-
pen to enter a check cell (leading to subsequent fines, when audited). Hence it is
in the own interest of users to have their system up-to-date. Whenever the SE
does not have—for whatever reasons—an up-to-date list of check cells, it should
report so via an alarm signal to the user. There should be procedures in place
for malfunction, for instance by pushing a ‘reset’ button (including an implicit
notification to the TSP) or by going quickly to some service station. Alternat-
ively, one could consider to let the SE resort to treat all cells as check cells when
it is not equipped with a proper, up-to-date list of check cells. This implies that
the scheme provides no privacy when subscribers do not properly update their
OBU.
From a system perspective the secure element is trusted and inaccessible to
malicious users. In contrast, the OBU is untrusted. When the trusted element
ever gets compromised, the system breaks down. This is usually the case with
a TCB: if a SIM gets compromised identities can be stolen and phone bills
will probably end up with the wrong person. But having this tamper resistant
SE as TCB also simplifies matters a lot: the SE is trusted so it can simply
accumulate the fees per cell, store the result in its non-volatile memory, and
report the cumulative fee, appropriately authenticated, to the TSP at the end
of the reporting period. Because we have such a clearly separated TCB we do
not need to use the homomorphic encryptions and proofs as in [3].
Both the TC and TSP trust the accumulation of fees reported by the SE,
but they do not trust that the SE has been notified appropriately by the OBU
at every cell transition. The TC and TSP thus check these notifications via the
tickets. As part of the fee reporting—or possibly only on request of the TSP—
the OBU sends all tickets of the reporting period to the TSP. The TSP can then
open the tickets for the checkpoint cells where the vehicle has been spotted and
see if the content is appropriate. The TSP can also communicate this evidence
to the TC. Details are given below, in Section 3.
2.3 Cells and roads
Figure 1. An expensive cell exclusively covering a motorway segment, in between two
exits, surrounded by inexpensive cells.
One thing that is new in our approach is the reliance on cells, and not on road
segments or distance, as basis for payment. It deserves some more explanation.
One basic idea in roadpricing is that certain roads (e.g. busy motorways) or
bridges/tunnels are more expensive than for instance quiet country roads. Simply
making all cells in which an expensive motorway occurs expensive is too crude,
since there may be multiple roads in a particular cell. What we propose is that the
price of a cell with multiple roads corresponds to the price of the cheapest road
(in that cell). In order to charge the appropriate fee for an expensive road one
cell is made very expensive that only contains this road and cannot be avoided.
Such a cell can for instance be found on a stretch of motorway in between two
exits, as illustrated in Figure 1. Of course, such a cell is a prime candidate to be
(regularly) a check cell.
One (more) advantage of using cells over road segments is that substantial
margins can be allowed in the accuracy of the location provided by the position-
ing system, see Figure 2. This is a great benefit, since in practice the positioning
accuracy is influenced for instance by atmospheric disturbances or by reflections
of satellite signals in urban areas. Such lack of accuracy may be a problem for
a road-segment based approach, when there are adjacent, parallel roads with
different prices. In contrast, our cell-based approach is more robust. Also, the
system is independent of the (often proprietary) mechanisms for transforming
satellite signals into road segments, on which other roadpricing approaches rely.
Hence it can be realized more easily via open (international) standards.
error margin
actual cell
Figure 2. Positioning system error margin around cells.
An interesting question is what the ideal size of cells is. We think this is a
topic of its own that requires a systematic quantative analysis. At this stage we
only provide intuitive argumentation why small cells are good for privacy.
The privacy sensitive event at stake is when your position becomes known to
the system. There are two occasions when this may happen:
1. when your car is photographed by a road-side camera; necessarily, the cell
in which this camera is located is a check cell;
2. when you pass through a check cell and you report this passage—assuming
that you follow the protocol.
It is best for privacy if these occasions coincide. Concretely, this means that in
every check cell you should be photographed. Or, formulated differently, you do
not pass through a check cell without being photographed. Thus, a cell needs to
be small in order to guarantee that you will be photographed when it contains
a camera.
More concretely, assume a city like Nijmegen has 5 cameras. If the city is
covered by 9 cells and we assume the cameras are in different cells, there is a
chance of 5
9
that you will report your presence in Nijmegen to the back office,
independent of whether you are photographed or not. However, if Nijmegen is
covered by 50.000 cells (in the order of 100 × 100 meters), there is a chance of
only 5
50.000
that you reveal your presence.
Hence smaller cells means less unnecessary reporting of presence and thus
better privacy protection. In Section 6 we use 100× 100 meter as cell size in a
sample calculation.
2.4 Timing
As we argued above, the timing of fee reporting, auditing, and feedback is a
sensitive matter in road pricing. In our approach, fee reporting takes place:
1. at the end of the reporting period;
2. when a vehicle leaves the road pricing area (e.g. the country);
3. when a vehicle is sold or taken out of service.
The last point is rather special. It can be handled by giving an OBU a special
‘report now’ button; after pushing it the embedded SE should be removed.
The passage of a border will be detected by the OBU and should lead to an
(automatic) fee report. It may create some administrative overhead for people
who frequently cross borders, but since fee reporting is automatic this should
not be such a problem.
It is a more serious problem if the fee report is suppressed by a malicious
user upon leaving the road pricing area. In this way a vehicle may disappear
from the grid. However, upon re-entering there are two options.
• This re-entering happens ‘soon’, still within the same reporting period as
the departure; then the vehicle can in principle continue to drive around in
the roadpricing area, using the (still valid) list of check cells in its SE. The
OBU/SE will have to report normally, at the end of this period.
• Re-entering happens ‘late’, in a subsequent reporting period. There is now
a window for fraud, because the check locations from the reporting period
of departure must be assumed to be publicly known. However, the vehicle
will need an (updated) list of check cells before it can drive around after re-
entering without any risk. It is at this point that it has to communicate with
the TSP, to request the new list, and the TSP notices the missing report
(from the period of departure); the TSP will impose a (hefty) penalty.
The first, ordinary way of reporting happens at the end of the reporting
period, say once a month. Vehicles will be forced to report, because only after
reporting they will receive the new list of check cells. Since there is some time
in between entering one cell and entering the next one, the fee reporting need
not interfere with the ordinary declaring.
After (some time after) receiving the fee reports and distributing the new
lists of check cells, the TSP goes into the auditing phase: tickets for check cells
will be decrypted and inspected, possibly leading to penalties. Notice that this
auditing does not require any interaction with the user—assuming appropriate
tickets for check cells are submitted.
(There is one practical issue related to performance. If all vehicles submit
their fee report at 24:00 hours of the last day of the month, communication
channels will be overloaded. Hence one may wish to allocate different reporting
times to different vehicles, in order to balance the load. This involves some
additional administration, including management of check cells lists and delay
of auditing, but it does not change the system fundamentally.)
3 The protocol
This section describes our new, privacy-friendly ETP protocol. This protocol is a
triple < S,U ,D > of polynomial-time interactive protocols. The Setup Protocol
S is a two party protocol involving the TSP and the SE. This protocol is run when
a new SE is added to the system. The Update protocol U is a three party protocol
involving the SE, the TSP and the OBU. This protocol runs periodically, at the
end/begining of a billing period, e.g. monthly. The protocol Declare Segment D
is a two party protocol involving the SE and the OBU. This protocol runs every
time that the vehicle enters a new cell.
Notation: We write {m }pk to denote the encryption of message m with public
key pk, while [m ]sk denotes messagem followed by a signature onm with private
key sk.
System Setup S When the system is initialized,
• the TSP creates a public key pair (pkTSP, skTSP) and together with the TC
partitions the map of the country (or region under consideration) in small
cells, forming a grid that overlaps the relevant area. Let C be a mapping
from GPS coordinates (lat, long) to a cell number c. These cells must be
small enough to provide the desired granularity level for road pricing. The
function P assigns to each cell c and time t the corresponding road price p.
• the OBU stores a ticket list T which is initialized to the empty list.
• the SE of a vehicle generates its own public key pair (pk, sk). The public key
is registered by the TSP and the public key pkTSP of the TSP is stored in the
SE and in the OBU. The SE also has a counter balance which is initialized
to zero.
Update U The purpose of the update protocol is threefold:
• for the TSP to get the toll charge for the last billing period;
• for the SE to get the updated checkpoint list for the next billing period;
• to perform fraud detection.
At the beginning of each billing period, the TC creates a list checkpoints of
checkpoint cells. The checkpoint cells are those cells where the TC will have
a surveillance camera for the next billing period. These checkpoint cells will
be used later on for fraud detection. To prevent abuse from the TC/TSP, the
maximum size of the checkpoints list Nchk must be enforced by the SE to be a
small fraction of the total number of cells in the map Ncells. This prevent TC or
TSP to set too many cells in the system as checkpoints thus hampering privacy.
At the end of of each billing period, the TSP, OBU and SE execute the
following protocol.
1. OBU→ TSP : update vehicle v
2. SE→ OBU : [ balance, ts ]skSE
3. OBU→ TSP : { [ balance, ts ]skSE , T }pkTSP
4. TSP→ OBU : { [checkpointsnew, ts ]skTSP }pkSE
5. OBU→ SE : { [checkpointsnew, ts ]skTSP }pkSE
The OBU initiates the update protocol identifying the vehicle. Then, the SE
sends the current balance balance and the time stamp ts signed with its private
key skSE. The OBU sends this last message, together with the ticket list of tickets
T , encrypted to the TSP in step (3). In step (4) the TSP sends the checkpoint list
for the next billing period checkpointsnew signed together with a timestamp
ts. This list is encrypted with the public key pkSE of the SE. In step (5) of the
protocol, the OBU simply forwards this message to the SE. The SE validates
that the time stamp ts is in the future with respect of its notion of time i.e.,
ts > time and sets time = ts and updates its checkpoint list.
When the TSP performs fraud detection, it is assumed that the TC provided
TSP with evidence that the vehicle v has been at cell c at time t. Then the TSP
will decrypt each entry in the transcript list T provided by v (see Section 6 for
optimizations), ignoring those entries that decrypt to zero. One of these entries
must be of the form < cpre, ccur, ts, p > with c = ccur and ts ≈ t. If that is not
the case it means that this vehicle has committed fraud.
The signature over the new checkpoint list on steps (4) and (5) is there to
prevent an adversary from being able to send a corrupt (potentially empty)
checkpoint list to the SE which would result on fines, or other kind of damage,
for the affected vehicles. Note that these signatures are not required for the
security of the protocol as defined in Section 4.
Declare Segment D Every time that the vehicle enters a new cell ccur, the
OBU and the SE run the following protocol
1. OBU→ SE : cpre, ccur, ts, p
2. SE→ OBU : ticket
where cpre is the previous cell, ccur is the current cell C(lat, long), ts is the
local time and p is the toll price P(ccur, ts). Upon receival of message (1), the
secure element verifies that the cell cpre correspond to the ccur of the previous
Declare Segment protocol run. The SE validates that the time stamp ts is in
the future with respect of its notion of time i.e., ts > time and checks that
p > 0. Then the SE adapts it local time, by setting time = ts, and increases
the counter balance by p, and subsequently it returns a ticket. If the cell ccur ∈
checkpoints then the SE sets ticket := { [cpre, ccur, ts, p]SE }pk
TSP
. Otherwise
it sets ticket := { 0 }pk
TSP
. The OBU stores the ticket from message (2) in the
ticket list T , until the next update protocol execution.
We remark that the subscriber’s OBU can, independently of the SE, store all
declarations in plaintext and keep its own balance register allowing the subscriber
to validate the charges sent to the TSP during the update protocol. We also
remark that one can easily let the cell numbers support a notion of adjacency
allowing the SE to determine that the previous and current cell are not adjacent
allowing an additional form of fraud detection.
4 Security notions
This section introduces different security notions. Most of it is standard and it
is taken from the literature. It first recalls the notion of indistinguishability un-
der chosen ciphertext attacks for an encryption scheme and the notion of strong
existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks for a signature scheme.
Then we propose a new security definition for ETP protocols that capture real-
istic threats that have not been considered in previous security definitions from
the literature.
Definition 4.1. An encryption scheme is a triple Γ = (K, E ,D) of probabil-
istic polynomial-time algorithms. K takes as input the security parameter 1η and
produces a key pair (pk, sk) where pk is the public encryption key and sk is the
private decryption key. E takes as input a public key pk and a plaintext m and
outputs a ciphertext. D takes as input a private key sk and a ciphertext and out-
puts a plaintext or ⊥. It is required that P[(pk, sk)← K(1η); c← E(pk,m);m′ ←
D(sk, c) : m = m′] = 1. We write {m }pk to denote E(pk,m).
Definition 4.2 (IND-CCA-Game).
IND-CCA-GameΓ,A(η) :
(sk, pk)← K(1η)
p0, p1 ← A
D
0 (pk)
b← {0, 1}
b′ ← AD1 ({ pb }pk)
winif if b = b′.
Adversaries implicitly pass state i.e., from A0 to A1.
Definition 4.3 (IND-CCA). An encryption scheme Γ is said to be IND-CCA
secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A = (A0,A1)
P[IND-CCA-GameΓ,A(η)]− 1/2
is a negligible function of η. This adversary has access to a decryption oracle D
that on input a bitstring c′ outputs D(sk, c) with the only restriction that c is not
equal to the challenge ciphertext { pb }pk.
We recall the definition of signature scheme and the notion of strong existential
unforgeability under chosen message attacks.
Definition 4.4. A signature scheme is a triple (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) of probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms. Gen takes as input the security parameter 1η and
produces a key pair (vk, sk) where vk is the signature verification key and sk is
the secret signing key. Sign takes as input sk and a message m and produces a
signature s of m. Vrfy takes as input vk, a message m and a signature s and
outputs whether or not s is a valid signature of m.
SEUΣ(A) :
(vk, sk)← Gen(1η)
m,σ ← ASsk(vk)
winif Vrfy(vk, (m,σ))
We recall the standard notion of strong existential unforgeability under chosen
message attacks [5].
Definition 4.5 (Strong existential unforgeability). A signature scheme
Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) is a strong, existential unforgeable if the success probabil-
ity of any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the game SEUΣ,A(η) is
negligible in the security parameter η.
Next we introduce a new security notion for ETP protocols. Here an ad-
versary is able to navigate a number of vehicles at will and it is also able to
communicate with a number of secure elements and with the TSP. The ad-
versary wins the game if it is able to get a toll fee reduction for any vehicle
and manages to do so with low probability of being detected. Low probability
here means lower probability than that of simply driving by through a random
cell without declaring it. Such an adversary models, for instance, the situation
where a number of users collude in order to avoid toll charges. This threat has
not been considered by Balasch et al [3].
Definition 4.6 (Security-Game).
Security-GameΠ,A(η) :
params← Setup(1η)
v ← AO,D(params)
(l, t)← Trajectory(v)
p, b← Result(v)
winif if b = 1 and p < P((l, t))
were the adversary A has access to an oracle D which on input a vehicle iden-
tifier v and a GPS coordinate g, models the (physical) movement of vehicle
v from the current location to GPS coordinates g. If g corresponds to a cell
c ∈ checkpoints then the oracle provides the corresponding evidence to the
TSP. A has also access to an oracle O which allows her to communicate to
the other parties (in this case the SE and the TSP) in the ETP protocol Π.
The function Trajectory, on input a vehicle identifier v returns a vector of pairs
Location× Time, corresponding to the trajectory of vehicle v that has been sub-
mitted to the oracle D during the previous billing period. The function Result,
on input a vehicle identifier v returns the toll charge p which v has to pay as
a result of the last Update protocol run, together with a bit b which equals one
when no fraud has been detected for vehicle v. The function P is overloaded in
the definition to vectors of Location×Time pairs and computes the correct price
of this trajectory.
Definition 4.7 (Security). An ETP protocol Π =< S,U ,D > is said to be
secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A
P[Security-GameΠ,A(η)] < Nchk/Ncells + negl(η)
where negl is a negligible function on its input η.
5 Security and privacy of the protocol
Theorem 5.1 (Security). If the encryption scheme Γ is IND-CCA secure and
the signature scheme Σ is strong, existential unforgeable then the protocol pro-
posed in Section 3 is secure with respect to Definition 4.7.
Proof. Assume by the contrary that there is an adversary A that wins the
Security-Game with probability significantly larger than Nchk/Ncells. In order
for A to be able to win the Security-Game, it must be able to drive a vehicle
through a cell without declaring it or do so but with a lower price. In order to
win with probability significantly higher than Nchk/Ncells, it must either be able
to construct valid tickets for the checkpoint cells or be able to avoid checkpoint
cells with non-negligible advantage. In the first case case we build the following
adversary B against the IND-CCA security of the encryption scheme. In the
second we build the following adversary C against the strong unforgeability of
the signature scheme.
The adversary B will first simulate the environment for A, this is, it will
proceed as in System Setup, creating all public key pairs by itself, except for
pkSE of a randomly chosen vehicle v. For this key B will use the challenge key
from the IND-CCA game to A. Then, B creates a checkpoint list containing
one single cell c and sets the challenge plaintext p0 = {c} and sets p1 equal
to the empty checkpoint list. B receives then a challenge ciphertext { pb }pk
SE
which it uses in step 4 of the Update protocol for v. At some point A stops and
outputs a vehicle identifier v′. If v 6= v′ then B stops and outputs a random bit
b′. Otherwise B picks a random cell c′ and compare how many times the vehicle
v drives through c and c′. If v drives through c′ more than through c then B
stops and outputs zero. By the contrary, if v drives through c more (or equally)
often than through c′ then it outputs one.
Next we construct an adversary C against the strong unforgeability of the
signature scheme. Just as before, C will simulate the environment for A, creating
all public key pairs by herself, except for pkSE of a randomly chosen vehicle v.
For this key C will use the challenge key from the SEU game. Whenever C needs
a signature using skSE it will simply invoke the signing oracle Ssk. At some point
A stops and outputs a vehicle identifier v′. If v 6= v′ then C stops as well and
outputs ⊥. If v = v′ then C will analyze the transcript of the Update protocol for
vehicle v submitted by A to the oracle O, in particular to message 5. C decrypts
this message (since it has possession of skTSP) and all tickets in the ticket list T .
As a result C obtains a number of signatures (ignoring those tickets that decrypt
to zero). From these signatures C ignores those that it has submitted to the
signing oracle Ssk. From the remaining signatures it chooses one at random and
stops. In case that there is no such a signature, then it outputs ⊥.
Theorem 5.2 (Privacy). If the checkpoint list matches the actual positioning
of surveillance cameras, then the scheme proposed in Section 3 does not leak any
extra location information about the vehicles.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that whenever the current position of a vehicle
is not a checkpoint cell, then the only information received by the TSP is an
encryption of zero.
6 Practical considerations and extensions
This section elaborates on practical issues concerning getting public trust in the
SE, regarding memory, communication and computational complexity of the
protocol and it discusses possible optimizations.
With respect to getting public trust in the SE we suggest that it is certified
against an appropriate common criteria profile and that its source code (e.g. Ja-
vaCard applet) is disclosed. In addition, we suggest that after a certain period of
time the checkpoint lists are also disclosed and that subscribers can get access to
cryptographic keys through the TSP allowing them to inspect the actual tickets
sent in the update protocol. To further convince subscribers that they are not
sent checkpoints specifically tailored for them one could sent the checkpoints in
through broadcast (e.g., through the Radio Data System (RDS) which is com-
monly used for dissemination of road traffic information). Using RDS would also
allow for regular checkpoint updates without the need for the subscriber to be
connected to a two way communication network such as GSM, GPRS or UMTS
that also allow for pinpointing the subscriber’s location. Actually, it might also
be cheaper to use RDS broadcasts than point-to-point communication. To avoid
usage of a static cryptographic key shared by all SEs in this context, we suggest
a common temporary session key is negotiated with all (non-revoked) SEs as
part of the update protocol.
If we consider cells of 100 by 100 meters, then in a European context 32 bit
cell numbers will be sufficient. The protocol described in Section 3 generates a
ticket list of approximately 1 MB per 1000 km. Given that the average car usage
in Europe is in the order of 15000 km per year, this accounts for 15 MB of data
per car per year, which is manageable but it can be improved.
It is possible to reduce the computational and bit complexity of the protocol
by a small modification in the Declare Segment protocol D. This modification
consists of accumulating a number of tickets at the SE and issuing only one
ticket every N cells. This ticket contains the same information as the earlier N
tickets, but it requires only one signature and one encryption. This modification
does not affect the security of the scheme as long as the resulting ticket is of
constant size, i.e, padding should be used for those tickets that are just zero.
For N = 10 this optimization reduces the size of the transcript file to just 200
KB per 1000 km which accounts to roughly 3Mb of data per year for an average
user. If we consider monthly reports, the transcript file that needs to be sent will
be on average of size 300 KB.
If this modest communication complexity is considered unacceptable, it can
further be reduced by only auditing a small random set of users. In Step (3)
in the Update protocol U the vehicle can first commit to a certain balance and
then the TSP decides probabilistically whether it will request the ticket list T
or not. This comes of course as a trade off for security but it can be a viable
option when the sanctions for fraud are severe enough.
Both optimizations reduce the amount of data that needs to be transmitted
and the computational complexity of the protocol. This is also important for the
TSP. In order to search for the ticket for a particular spot check, the TSP needs
to perform a number of decryptions. The timestamp in the tickets can be used
to search through the ticket list in (probabilistic) logarithmic time.
We remark that the scheme can obviously support more than one balance
register corresponding with cell cost categories instead of actual monetary values.
In this way the OBU does not need to be updated with actual cost information;
the transformation from cell cost categories to actual cost can be done by the
TSP. Also the scheme can support various checkpoint lists varying from more
locally oriented lists to list for subscribers who have been caught on actual fraud
and get larger checkpoint list as a penalty. We also remark that the scheme
trivially supports toll roads by just letting toll road segments correspond to
cells. We finally remark that the system can also support parking fee payment,
by introducing a status to cells, e.g “driving” and “parking”. The transition
from one status to another would give rise to the Declare protocol. In a parking
environment this would give rise to two declarations: one from driving to parking
and one from parking to driving, which can be associated with a parking fee. Of
course, the OBU would somehow need to know how the status of the vehicle; for
parking this could be induced by turning of the vehicle ignition key. If the parking
cell is in the checklist then - as before - both declarations will be submitted to
the TSP, allowing for inspection.
7 Conclusions
We have proposed a novel protocol for Electronic Traffic Pricing. This protocol
has fairly relaxed accuracy requirements for positioning hardware, making it
easier to implement in practice, in an open manner. The protocol is resilient to
colluding adversaries where the positioning of the checkpoints remain secret, even
after the reporting of road usage to the TSP. In contrast to other systems from
the literature, this reporting procedure does not require user interaction which
would drastically improve its acceptability. Additionally, the current approach
only involves interaction with the user when fraud is detected, and not during
honest usage.
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